

"my" refs: Vienna — Nitzsche interview
Paris — " notes
My CFR seminar
— Crisis Pattern — F. MA.
[Amakuni
Dalyation]

— Mikoyan
— OSR — Aug 23, Sept 6
— Kilpatrick speech (FU) (Chapman) (Hans)
my proposed message to K, by JFK on up!
JFK July 25? speech

CHECK WITH RIKYNE !

— Effort of Kilpatrick — on humiliation; desire to change "balance" (of FS)
— Aim of SU to match/equal US FS cap — here, inhibit
US FU threat (e.g. on Berlin) (allow SU to offer no unilateral),
as to China: to threaten SU 2nd-use, without no work from
US escalation (but it triggers SU FS);

||| US FU threat rested on MONOPOLY OF FS/PREEMPTIVE THREAT,
HENCE MONOPOLY OF THREAT TO ESCALATE.

(Though, in '90's: superiority in FS that
on our part " " "

is a better basis for US than of FU or use

there is absence of FS that gives
us an extra rise

or (want) SU monopoly of FS that
(= US, 1955-64)

— link with Berlin (via. warnings) + election

— JFK speech before Oct 15 (K anticipated, control on?)

Oct Planning } Eth JFK gave more credence than admitted to SSMs
→ PSALM } or (without expecting SSMs, or being sure) thought he would
win over (as of Aug, Sept, Oct — a real risk, in
without SSMs — as PDS judges, 9 Feb 89)

^{US}
- Improved relations: to Cuba (UN...)

- US "improving" of status (JFK - McN? — willing to withdraw)

1. Sows: a) to be cautious with US reaction
- NOT TO RELY ON LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON US! (Schulz RFR, 505)

b) Not to put MRBMs in NVN
(or Migs in Nicaragua)

c) Not to refrain from aid to DRV

- to refrain from putting SAMS, M. J. 20, in NVN

d) TO SEEK MILITARY PARITY (the hard way) in Nicaragua
BEFORE EXPECTING DIPLOMATIC PARITY

US
US:

11. Avial brotherhood: nuclear crisis.

2. Not: Sows don't have total control over small allies.

- Not: (immediately): STOP MONGOOSE; give up (?) invasion thoughts.

3. Not: bring in real experts on local affairs: + Sows.

- McN Claim: McN's law (immediately): not true, from Cuba II (→ VN) 100

4. Sows always back down in end?

"During the service" (McN 52) - Soutine, Junior

5. "Unilateral pressure" is best, & work; avoid "irreversible" action (Ball, 25)
(Blockade; \Rightarrow 34A, RT, troops ("not irreversible" 49

- "GOOD DOCTOR" TACTIC (if you expect to "deal" eventually) RNC - pg 28, 65!

6. 34A (= Mongoose) is worth doing.

(for provocation?)

7. Avial, if possible, invasion ^{or bombing} (NVN) that might bring
in SU or China. (not so much: that would fail)
as in Cuba

8. Not: be ready to make major concessions
rather than get in large, limited war

(Maybe: ... only to avoid war with SU or China).

- committing efforts of limited combat (RT, troops)

9. No lessons about: - actual combat of us. "McN's law")

- form of Cuba (VNM, Africa...)
to stimulate us

- restraint on small ally/China/Portugal

- CR, civil war, guerrilla war

- public support during long war

10. (LBO, NOT N): Don't rely on FU threat.

0. Motives for US FS buildup; sel, US FO threats (Kilpatrick) X
(Effect of Cuban defections on)

1. MongOOSE.

X (ONLY cursory
discussion, by official
(denial))

1A. JFK priority to Mongoose; ^{JFK} resolutions for invasion

2. Invasion planning: April '62
Oct '62

X (dry criticism (McN)
or upturn)

3. Assass. efforts.

lack of belief (by McN, others) - ^{significant} change in strategic balance, or power

4. JFK willingness to trade

IRBMs. ("Munich" - as assigned to Stevenson).

5. RFK offer of private deal.

X (McN)

6. RFK ultimatum on IRBMs

Secret: X (McN)
[For Brennan + McN: this was a bluff,
w/ 48 hrs.]

7. RFK warning ^{new} on shootdown.

X (don't know,
focus on it)

8. Mongoose after Cuba II: - through March 63

- after " 63-Nov 63

- 1964

9. PEARL, + similar restrictions on decision.

X

14. Leves: What did K "learn" about JFK - + USG - from Bay of Pigs? Vietnam?
Wall? Kilpatrick? Berlin
Feb 25?

10. (Leves: What K planned for Berlin,

if missiles remained? What was his aim, needs, a strategy?
also - (Korean war?)

11. Leves: What K ^{not just, planned} would have done, on Berlin or Suez (X)
if missiles struck; or if invasion.

SCHLES, RFK 512

15. How certain was K that JFK would not discover? What did he think/doubt/fear
would break if he did?

12. Leves: What was nature of warnings + assurance on
Berlin and on election; and timing of proposal
(w/ election? To invasion plans?) WHY NOT SAY FIRST?
(WHAT WAS RUSH?)

13. Leves: Did offer of a private deal on IRBMs have any effect
at the time? Half later? (X)

Did SU finally
a high risk
of this?

WAS THERE AN
"INTENT" TO BOMB
NUK, IN 1964?
TO INVADE SUN?
(" " NUK?)
SHOULD SU HAVE
FORESEEN THESE,
OR NOT?

38: non-Berlin
crisis 8 '63

US: What would
JFK have done -
if missiles not
deployed, till
"operational"?
WHY WARHEADS
SENT?
45, 274-75

Shooting of ~~provision~~ of ~~provision~~
con of "
fake of "

(Cuba I; ~~mogson~~; TG/34A/Plinian; ~~Mingua~~

- ISN'T THIS
ALL BEING
DONE TO
NICARAGUA?
(Branch +
Cuba)
- Carter strategies (2) → cause general uprising, revolt,
by harassing, sabotaging economy (get any to defect?
see CIA, Aug 62
Chile 1970-73; ~~Montana~~?
(Brazil?)
Nicaragua?)
(see ^{mid-} 1961, dealing with CIA, Tech Services?)
Rostow/CIA, Oct 62

- US fear (SU ~~hits~~?) of horizontal esp
Cuba - Berlin
see SN/E

- Confrontation in mechanisms

(see LBJ/aiders; LBJ/RFK; me to Hon. Graham;
McG's Tatters; McN to WAA demonstrators;
Van/VC, Korten, 72; R. MA's; JFK/RFK/Costa

Branch - Chile
(RFK like R/North vs. Khaddafi or Ortega?!)

Branch +
Cuba, 61

- Did Castro exaggerate prob. of invasion; manipulate
Sovs, hoping into support & pledge, actually
into SSYs?

Heinrich + Tenn

- when did Keating get his estate, Oct 10
Did JFK believe he had a paper nose, McCar, who was forcing his hand?

Was this a hidden comment in crisis?

How did JFK react?

(see survey of Fomin contact)

(Walter E. Blum, 1964)

- "First letter" on 26th, always described wrong;
2d, also, as "raising the ante". B+W, 255

- 256: were there 2 Dob/RFK talks: one in Embassy,
one in prison?

- Role of emotion:

- F.M.A... insult, etc.

- response to violent attack

370, B+W

- by Sorens (see SNIE; Minkowski; JFK's list. of K)

- by JFK (to match Sorens plan)

- JFK

- Paris issue (B+W 257 rights)

military Paris

dip. "

- Castro reactions (AA; ...) (see B+W 259)

see Castro/Marking

- What is the meaning of the Eastern/Oran statement?

"New Things" - ^{appropriate} post-reaction (see Shokryanov,
B+W 259-60)

see Henthoff,

B+W 91

Sorensen, 93

- N: good vs. bad (Real War)

- our global responsibilities

obligations

commitments

^{mult} states, concern

(result of: alliances

(Cuba; ME and / from
West Europe

on strength (superiority)

(see K to JFK at Vina: ✓

"We have commitments."

Don't "misunderstand"

K: you have subtle ways of making things

NC

- our rights to threaten or impose ^{use} coercion

(both are "uses" of coercion)

(for "good," "we do," "threats," "commitments," "responsibilities")

(We did not ask to be watched at the
gate, but there is no one else")

NC

- right to control, effort

(These follow from use, and right to

use, nuclear force; it "corrupts"

"Treaty" + "aid" ...

- right to Open Door - "level playing field"

(in other' countries:

at least not ^{level} with other foreign

countries, but not ^{with} the

domestic firm there).

- Open Door wanted to US attacks, if necessary:

us. (Cuban Miss (1961)) SSMs (SAMs) 1962

Missile Miss, USA and not other

- N: good vs. bad (Real War)

- our global responsibilities

obligations

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^{and} states, concern

(result of: alliances)

(Cuba; ME and / from
West Europe)

on strength (superiority)

(see K to JFK at Vina: ✓)

"We have commitments."

Don't "mischaracterize"

K: you have subtle ways of making things

NC

- our rights to threaten or impose ^{use} coercion

(both are "uses" of coercion)

(for "good," "we do," "threats," "commitments," "responsibilities")

(We did not ask to be watched at the
gate, but there is no one else")

NC

- right to control, effort

(There follows from use, and right to

use, nuclear force; it "corrupts"

"Trust" + "aid" ...

- right to Open Door - "level playing field"

(in other countries:

at least / not at all with other foreign

countries, but not with the

domestic firms there).

- Open Door wanted to US attacks, if necessary;

us. (Cuban Miss (1961), SSMs (SAMs) 1962

Missiles Miss, BM and not detonate